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1. Introduction 
I am filing these brief comments on the Revised Proposed Final Judgment (“RPFJ”)
(1) and 
Competitive Impact Statement (“CIS”)
(2) to provide the Justice Department and the court 
with a useful economic analysis to assist the court in judging the appropriateness of the 
remedy in the RPFJ. I believe that the RPFJ is in the “public interest,” as that test is 
applied under the Tunney Act. Accordingly, the RPFJ should be approved. 
2. Interest Of The Commenter 
I am professor of economics at the Stern School of Business of New York University 
specializing in industrial organization and antitrust with particular emphasis on network 
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industries. I am filing this submission in my own personal capacity and not on behalf of 
the New York University or the Stern School of Business. I am not employed or retained 
as a consultant on matters before this court by Microsoft, the United States Department of 
Justice, the Attorneys General of various States that sued Microsoft or any other interested 
party. Furthermore, I am not receiving any compensation from anyone for submitting 
these comments. 
I have followed this case closely and extensively for the past several years, in my 
academic capacity. Since 1995, I have created and maintain the “Economics of Networks” 
web site on the Internet at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/ that has acted as a focal 
point for academic research in the economics of network industries. Since the beginning 
of the present Microsoft case, I have added a number of pages on this web site that 
contain information and my analysis of this case. I have published three articles in 
refereed journals(3) on the specific issues raised by the present matter and I attach the 
article “United States v. Microsoft: A Failure of Antitrust in the New Economy,” 
Symposium: Cyber Rights, Protection, and Markets, UWLA Law Review, (April 2001) as 
Attachment B. I also have published over 70 articles in industrial organization, 
competition policy, antitrust, networks, and telecommunications issues. My Curriculum 
Vitae is attached as Attachment A. I believe that my academic expertise, as well as my 
experience in competition policy in a number of matters, including the merger of MCI 
with WorldCom and the proposed merger of WorldCom with Sprint, as well as in a 
number of regulatory telecommunications proceedings is relevant to the issues raised in 
this case. 
On November 6, 2001, the United States and the States of New York, Illinois, North 
Carolina, Kentucky, Michigan, Louisiana, Wisconsin, Maryland and Ohio reached a 
proposed final judgment (RPFJ ) that will terminate litigation in the above cases. My 
comments below are supportive of the proposed final judgment, argue against other 
remedial proposals, and discuss various issues that are relevant to the case. In my opinion, 
the RPFJ is a good and fair settlement that achieves the objectives of remedial relief 
without damaging the software industry. 
3. Criteria For Remedies 
In the Appeals Court decision, Microsoft was found liable of monopolization of the 
market for operating systems for personal computers. The objective of the remedial relief 
is to impose prohibitions and requirements that will eliminate Microsoft’s practices that 
were found to be illegal, prevent the recurrence of such practices, and restore the threat 
posed by middleware to Microsoft’s operating systems monopoly. The remedial relief 
should also make sure that it does no damage the software industry, and should take into 
account two important special factors that are relevant to the case: (i) the very fast 
technological growth in these two markets; and (ii) the existence of network effects in the 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00022465.htm (4 of 17)7/14/2004 8:18:24 AMDOJ/Antitrust
market for operating systems and the market for software applications. 
a.  Remedies’ Limitations Imposed By Rapid Technological Change
Any intervention by antitrust authorities creates a disruption in the workings of markets. 
The objective of the remedial relief is to accomplish the objectives mentioned in the 
previous paragraph without damaging efficient production and competition in the market. 
The potential damage that antitrust intervention can produce is larger when it is applied to 
an industry such as software with fast technological change, where leaps to new and more 
efficient technologies are expected, while the specific nature of the future winning 
technology is unknown. Firms in the software business confess that they are uncertain of 
the future winning technology in their field of business. Antitrust authorities know even 
less than the firms in the field. It is plainly difficult to predict future winning technologies 
and therefore it is very hard to fashion an antitrust remedy with an accurate prediction of 
its effect on industry structure and competition a few years down the road. Of course, this 
uncertainty is multiplied when the remedy creates a significant intervention in the 
industry. Therefore, lacking the knowledge of the effects of their actions, it is in the public 
interest that antitrust authorities and courts avoid very extensive intervention in industries 
with fast technological change. It is best to intervene only to the extent that (i) 
intervention reverses the effects of actions for which liability was established; and (ii) the 
effects of the intervention are predictable. 
Another implication of very fast technical change in software is that the boundaries 
among the software products are fungible. Over time, these boundaries can be redrawn. 
New functions may be incorporated in larger programs, and sometimes it is more efficient 
to do so. An intervention that fits well in the present market may be counterproductive or 
irrelevant soon. 
b.  Remedies’ Limitations Imposed By Network Effects Of Software
The second special factor to be considered is that the Microsoft case focuses on markets 
with network effects, where the value to a buyer of an extra unit (say of Windows) is 
higher when more units are sold, everything else being equal. The existence of network 
effects has crucial implications on market structure and the ability of antitrust authorities 
to affect it. In markets with strong network effects, even in the absence of anti-
competitive acts, the existence of network effects in markets such as the market for 
operating systems of PCs, results in very significant inequalities in market shares and 
profits. The resulting equilibrium market structure can be called a “natural oligopoly” 
where very few firms dominate the market. The structural features of natural oligopoly for 
software market cannot be altered by antitrust intervention without very significant losses 
for society. The very nature of markets with network effects implies that the ability of 
antitrust authorities to alter market stricture in such industries is limited. I discuss this 
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issue next. 
In assessing the Microsoft case, it is important to remember that the case focuses on 
markets with network effects. Network effects define crucial features of market structure 
that have to be taken into consideration in understanding competition and potentially anti-
competitive actions in these markets. 
A market exhibits network effects (or network externalities)(4) when the value to a buyer 
of an extra unit is higher when more units are sold, everything else being equal. In a 
traditional network, network externalities arise because a typical subscriber can reach 
more subscribers in a larger network.(5) In a virtual network,(6) network externalities arise 
because larger sales of component A induce larger availability of complementary 
components B1, ..., Bn, thereby increasing the value of component A. The increased value 
of component A results in further positive feedback.(7) For example, the existence of an 
abundance of Windows-compatible applications increases the value of Windows. 
There are a number of crucial features of markets with network effects that distinguish 
them from other markets. First, markets with strong network effects where firms can 
chose their own technical standards are “winner-take-most” markets. That is, in these 
markets, there is extreme market share and profits inequality.(8) The market share of the 
largest firm can easily be a multiple of the market share of the second largest, the second 
largest firm’s market share can be a multiple of the market share of the third, and so on. 
This geometric sequence of market shares implies that, even for small n, the nth firm’s 
market share is tiny. 
For example, abundance of applications written for Windows increases the value of 
Windows and induces more consumers to buy Windows. This increases the incentive for 
independent applications writers to write applications for Windows, and this further 
increases sales and market share for Windows. Moreover, consumers are willing to pay 
more for the brand with the highest market share (since it has more associated 
applications), and therefore profits associated with this brand can be a large multiple of 
profits of other platforms. This implies a very large market share for Windows, a small 
market share for the Mac, a very small market share for the third competitor, and almost 
negligible shares for the fourth and other competitors. 
Second, due to the natural extreme inequality in market shares and profits in such markets 
at any point in time, there should be no presumption that there were anti-competitive 
actions that were responsible for the creation of the market share inequality or the very 
high profitability of a top firm. Great inequality in sales and profits is the natural 
equilibrium in markets with network externalities and incompatible technical standards. 
No anti-competitive acts are necessary to create this inequality.(9) 
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Third, because “winner takes most” is the natural equilibrium in these markets, attempting 
to superimpose a different market structure, (say one of all firms having approximately 
equal market shares), is futile and counterproductive. If a different market structure were 
imposed by a singular structural act (say a breakup of a dominant firm), the market would 
naturally deviate from it and instead converge to the natural inequality equilibrium. If 
forced equality were imposed as a permanent condition, it would create significant social 
inefficiency, as discussed below. 
Fourth, in network markets, once few firms are in operation, the addition of new 
competitors, say under conditions of free entry, does not change the market structure in 
any significant way. The addition of a fourth competitor to a triopoly hardly changes the 
market shares, prices, and profits of the three top competitors.(10) This is true under 
conditions of free entry. Therefore, although eliminating barriers to entry can encourage 
competition, the resulting competition does not significantly affect market structure. In 
markets with strong network effects, antitrust authorities cannot significantly affect 
equilibrium market structure by eliminating barriers to entry. 
Fifth, the fact that the natural equilibrium in network industries is winner-take-most with 
very significant market inequality does not imply that competition is weak. Competition 
on which firm will create the top platform and reap most of the benefits is, in fact, very 
intense. 
Sixth, there is a more fundamental concern about the application of antitrust in network 
industries.(11) In industries with significant network externalities, under conditions of 
incompatibility between competing platforms, monopoly may maximize social surplus. 
When strong network effects are present, a very large market share of one platform 
creates significant network benefits for this platform which contribute to large consumers’ 
and producers’ surpluses. It is possible to have situations where a breakup of a monopoly 
into two competing firms of incompatible standards reduces rather than increases social 
surplus because network externalities benefits are reduced. This is another way of saying 
that de facto standardization is valuable, even if done by a monopolist.(12) 
Seventh, in network industries, the costs of entry may be higher but the rewards of 
success may also be higher compared to non-network industries. Thus, it is unclear if 
there is going to be less entry in network industries compared to traditional industries. If a 
requirement for entry is innovation, one can read the previous statement as saying that it is 
unclear if innovation would be more or less intense in network industries. The dynamics 
of the innovation process in the winner-take-most environment of network industries are 
not sufficiently understood by academic economists so that they could give credible 
advice on this issue to antitrust authorities. However, in the last two decades we have 
observed very intense competition in innovative activities in network industries financed 
by capital markets. 
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Eighth, the existence of an installed base of consumers favors an incumbent. However, 
competitors with significant product advantages or a better pricing strategy can overcome 
the advantage of an installed base.(13) Network effects intensify competition, and an 
entrant with a significantly better product can unseat the incumbent. In network industries, 
we often observe Schumpeterian races for market dominance. This is a consequence of 
the winner-take-most natural equilibrium combined with the high intensity of competition 
that network externalities imply. 
4. Evaluation Of The Proposed Remedies in the RPFJ 
Evaluating the RPFJ in the framework of an industry with strong network externalities 
and fast technical change, I conclude that this is a fair settlement that imposes appropriate 
remedies for the violations for which Microsoft was found liable. The RPFJ contains 
some terms that may be seen as favorable to Microsoft, while, in most of its terms, it is 
favorable to the plaintiffs. Overall, in my opinion, the settlement is more favorable to the 
plaintiffs than what the final result of a remedies hearing would have been, given the 
Appellate Court decision. 
There are substantial benefits in settling the case rather than continuing litigation that is 
likely to result in a very similar final outcome. There is substantial uncertainty associated 
with the judicial process, which is awfully slow compared to the rate of progress in the 
computing industry. Given the position of Microsoft in the computing industry, the added 
uncertainty of an extended remedies trial would affect adversely not only Microsoft, but 
also the rest of the computing industry. 
The provisions of the settlement that may be seen as favorable to Microsoft are: (i) no 
structural changes, that is, no breakup of the company; (ii) Microsoft is not restricted from 
adding functions to the Windows operating system; (iii) there are no general restrictions 
imposed on product bundling by Microsoft; and (iv) there is no wide disclosure of source 
code; mandated disclosures are limited to interfaces. I discuss each one briefly. 
(i) No structural changes 
In my opinion, a structural change would be too draconian, especially after the narrowing 
of the liability by the Appellate Court, and would result in other inefficiencies. It is 
correctly avoided, and, after the Court of Appeals Decision, USDOJ correctly announced 
that it would not pursue a breakup (even before it entered into a settlement agreement). 
(ii) No restrictions on adding functions to Windows 
Freezing Windows in its present from and functionality and mandating that consumers 
would have to pay extra for future additional functions to Windows would be very 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms_tuncom/major/mtc-00022465.htm (8 of 17)7/14/2004 8:18:24 AMDOJ/Antitrust
detrimental to consumers’ welfare. The addition of functions to Windows while its price 
has been kept relatively low results is a big benefit to consumers. It would be contrary to 
the public interest to take actions that would decrease the benefit that consumers receive 
from this market. Moreover, since this is an industry with very fast technological change, 
freezing the functionality of a product would quickly make it irrelevant. This is not and 
should not be the intent of the application of antitrust law. 
(iii) No bundling restrictions 
The Appellate Court did not uphold the finding of liability of the lower court on tying, 
which was based on a per se reasoning. The Court of Appeals found that the per se 
analysis was inappropriate in this case for a number of reasons. The Appellate Court sent 
back the tying claim to the lower court to be judged (if the plaintiffs were to pursue it) 
under a rule of reason approach. Under this approach, the plaintiffs would have had to 
prove, in general terms, that the harm done by the tying was larger than any pro-consumer 
or pro-competitive benefits of the tying act. The plaintiffs decided not to pursue this 
course of action. This was wise, since it was likely that it would be very hard to meet the 
standard of the Appellate Court. Thus, it makes sense that the RPFJ does not impose 
general restrictions on bundling. 
(iv) No wide mandatory disclosure of source code 
The source code is the intellectual property of Microsoft. Confiscating intellectual 
property is a very extreme measure that would discourage innovation. Imposing forced 
disclosure or licensing would be very close to considering the operating system an 
essential facility and imposing regulation. It is not necessary to take these extreme 
measures to remedy the present violation.
The provisions of the settlement that are favorable to the plaintiffs are: (i) The broad 
scope of definition of middleware products; (ii) the requirement to disclose middleware 
interfaces; (iii) the requirement to disclose server protocols; (iv) freedom to install 
middleware software; (v) ban on retaliation; (vi) uniform pricing of Windows for same 
volume sale; (vii) ban on exclusive agreements; contract restrictions; and (viii) strict on-
site enforcement. 
(i) The broad scope of definition of middleware products 
The settlement defines “middleware” to include browsers, e-mail clients, media players, 
instant messaging software, and future new middleware developments. Most of these 
middleware products have no chance to ever become a platform that would become a 
threat to the Windows operating system. Therefore, by applying the settlement terms on 
all middleware as defined above, the plaintiffs much more favorable terms than they 
would have received from a remedies trial. In such a trial, given the monopolization 
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liability, only middleware that could be a threat to Windows would have been relevant, 
and the settlement (or other) terms would have been applied only to such middleware. 
Here the plaintiffs achieved better terms in the settlement than they were likely to get in a 
full remedies trial. 
(ii) The requirement to disclose middleware interfaces 
Microsoft will be required to provide software developers with the interfaces used by 
Microsoft’s middleware to interoperate with the operating system. This will allow 
development of competing (non-Microsoft) products that come very close to most 
Microsoft functions. Under the liability of monopolization, this is a reasonable 
requirement for middleware that has some chance of becoming a platform that will 
compete with Windows. When this requirement is applied by RPFJ to all middleware, the 
plaintiffs are getting better terms in the settlement than they were likely to get in a full 
remedies trial. 
(iii) The requirement to disclose server protocols 
The settlement imposes interoperability between Windows and non-Microsoft servers of 
the same level as between Windows and Microsoft servers. Servers and their 
interoperability with Windows were not part of the monopolization liability, and the 
plaintiffs would be unlikely to get this term in a full remedies trial. 
(iv) Freedom to install middleware software 
Computer manufacturers and consumers will be free to substitute competing middleware 
software on Microsoft's operating system. 
(v) Ban on retaliation 
Microsoft will be prohibited from retaliating against computer manufacturers or software 
developers for supporting or developing certain competing software. This is a reasonable 
restriction since Microsoft was found liable of monopolization. 
(vi) Uniform pricing of Windows for same volume sale 
Microsoft will be required to license its operating system to key computer manufacturers 
on uniform terms for five years. Microsoft will be allowed to provide quantity discounts. 
This eliminates the possibility of offering different prices to manufacturers that buy the 
same quantity. The effects of this restriction on total consumers’ and producers’ surplus 
are unknown. The likely effect of the restriction will be a transfer of wealth from 
Microsoft to computer makers (OEMs). There is no conclusive evidence in economic 
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theory that this restriction will increase total surplus of the combined consumers plus 
OEMs plus Microsoft surplus. On the contrary, if different OEMs faced different demand 
curves for PCs (because of variations in the PCs they produce), and this information was 
known to Microsoft, total surplus could be increased if Microsoft could charge different 
prices to different OEMs for the same quantity of sale. However, the imposition of this 
restriction can help avoid possible retaliation of Microsoft, so in the present context, it 
may be in the public interest. 
(vii) Ban on exclusive agreements; contract restrictions 
Microsoft will be prohibited from entering into agreements requiring the exclusive 
support or development of certain Microsoft software. This is a reasonable restriction 
since Microsoft was found liable of monopolization. 
(viii) Strict on-site enforcement 
A panel of three independent, on-site, full-time computer experts will help to enforce the 
terms of the settlement. The panel will have full access to all of Microsoft’s books, 
records, systems, and personnel, including source code. The panel will also have the 
authrity to resolve disputes about Microsoft’s compliance. This provides for a very strict 
enforcement mechnism and is a major victory for the plaintiffs who have compained in 
the past that Microsoft deviated from old agreements with the antitrust authorities. I 
would caution that this panel should not be used as a regulatory body. If regulation is ever 
to be imposed on the PC industry, it should come as an Act of Congress rather than as a 
gradual expansion of powers of this panel. As I have stated in the attached paper, there are 
many reasons why we should avoid for some time imposing regulation on the PC industry.
The above discussion shows that the proposed settlement covers a number of dimensions 
and imposes a number of requirements that are not strictly arising from the 
monopolization violation. In my opinion, as part of this settlement, the defendant has 
conceded to the plaintiffs more than the plaintiffs were likely to achieve in a full remedies 
trial.
5. Evaluation Of Other Remedies Proposals 
Here I evaluate other proposals, which I find detrimental to the public interest, and I 
recommend that they should be rejected. 
i.  Structural Relief
a.  Vertical Breakup
Structural relief is a draconian measure that should be reserved for those cases where 
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absolutely nothing else would work. In my opinion, it is very likely that the conduct 
remedies of the present proposed settlement will work, and there is no reason to resort to 
draconian measures. Two types of remedies have been proposed. The first is the “vertical 
breakup” imposed by Judge Jackson (and vacated by the Appellate Court) that would 
divide Microsoft in an operating systems company and an applications company.
Some have made the argument that the breakup is a surgical cut and therefore will disrupt 
the industry the least. This is countered by the facts. A breakup of Microsoft is an 
extremely disruptive outcome, and it would, practically speaking, eliminate Microsoft as a 
flexible and formidable competitor. 
The argument, that, since AT&T’s 1982 breakup was successful, so would Microsoft’s, is 
incorrect. AT&T was divided into the long-distance company (AT&T), and seven 
regional operating companies, each of which remained a regulated local 
telecommunications monopoly until 1996. The destruction of AT&T’s long-distance 
monopoly encouraged competition, which brought sharply lower prices and immense 
consumer benefits.(14) There are a number of key differences between the two companies 
and their competitive situations. And these differences make it very likely that a Microsoft 
breakup, besides harming Microsoft, would harm consumers and the computer industry. 
In 1981, AT&T was a 100-year-old regulated monopoly with many layers of 
management. For historical reasons, the local phone companies within the old AT&T, 
such as New York Telephone, were managed separately from the “long lines” division. 
Thus, it was not difficult to separate the divisions since they functioned on many levels as 
separate companies. AT&T also had an abundance of managers to help cope with the 
breakup. By contrast, Microsoft is a young, entrepreneurial company run by very few top 
executives (about 25), and its divisions are very fluid. While this has made Microsoft one 
of the most efficient and successful companies around, it also means that a break-up 
would pose significant managerial problems and severely reduce the company’s 
flexibility. Finally, AT&T was a regulated utility and regulation guaranteed that the 
companies emerging from the breakup stayed interconnected. In contrast, the Microsoft 
breakup is likely to lead to incompatibilities and further loss of efficiency. 
The vertical two-way breakup plan was premised on the hope that an autonomous 
applications company would create a new operating system to compete with Windows. 
But more than 70,000 applications run on Windows, creating what the government calls 
“the applications barrier to entry” in the operating-system market. However capable the 
new applications company, it still wouldn’t be able to single-handedly create a successful 
rival operating system. Separately, even with a new applications company’s support, 
Microsoft’s biggest operating-system competitor, Linux, is unlikely to become a serious 
desktop threat to Windows. 
A vertical breakup is likely to have detrimental effects. First, the breakup is likely to 
result in higher prices. If DOJ is correct and Microsoft kept its OS prices low so that it 
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could exercise its monopoly power in the adjacent browser market, the post-breakup Baby 
Bill(15) that inherits the operating systems will have no incentive to keep the price low. 
The OS Baby Bill will no longer have the incentive to disadvantage any applications 
companies. Thus, the OS Baby Bill will now exercise the monopoly power it has and raise 
the price of the operating system to the detriment of consumers. If Microsoft has 
significant monopoly power because of the “applications barrier to entry,” higher prices 
will be the direct result of the breakup. Second, as explained earlier, the breakup is likely 
to eliminate the efficiencies that make Microsoft a flexible and formidable competitor. 
The breakup is likely to temporarily eliminate the incentive for interference from OSs to 
applications and vice versa. Of course, the same could have been accomplished by 
conduct restrictions without the cost and the disruption of the breakup. Moreover, without 
permanent restrictions on the post-breakup functions of the companies, the OS and the 
applications Baby Bills may enter into each other’s business soon after the breakup. It is 
very likely that a few years after the breakup, one of the resulting companies will 
dominate both markets. 
b.  Hybrid Breakup
A second breakup proposal is the “horizontal breakup.” This extreme proposal would 
break up Microsoft into three identical companies, with each company acquiring the 
source code of all the programs that Microsoft currently sells, and one third of its 
employees.(16) This “horizontal breakup” is sometimes presented in combination with the 
“vertical breakup” imposed by Judge Jackson (and vacated by the Appellate Court). In 
this “hybrid breakup,” first Microsoft is broken into two or three companies according to 
the type of program produced, and then the operating systems company is broken into 
three parts creating four of five companies altogether. 
Besides the loss of flexibility that any breakup would create, a horizontal or hybrid 
breakup would also produce significant incompatibilities with harmful effects to computer 
users, applications writers, and Microsoft shareholders. Post-breakup Microsoft 
companies coming out of a horizontal or a hybrid breakup will have incentives to create 
incompatible versions of Windows for two reasons. First, post-breakup Microsoft 
companies will try to differentiate their operating systems to avoid strong competition, 
leading to small price-cost margins. This is true even in industries without network 
externalities and has been well established in the economics literature on product 
differentiation.(17) Second, post-breakup Microsoft companies will try to make their 
operating systems incompatible with each other in a race to become the dominant OS, 
since the dominant firm receives the lion’s share of profits in a winner-takes-most world. 
This is established in the network economics literature.(18) Differentiating the operating 
systems by Baby Bills would inevitably reduce the range of software that would be 
compatible with each user’s computer. As a consequence, consumers’ surplus would 
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decrease. The emerging incompatibilities would be a huge headache for both independent 
applications writers and corporate IT departments. Such incompatibilities would also hurt 
shareholders, since the combined value of the resulting Baby Bills will be smaller than 
that of the original Microsoft. 
ii.  Auctioning the Windows code
Another remedy proposal is auctioning the Windows source code. Given the fluctuating 
stock market value of Microsoft, Windows source code may be worth as much as $200 
billion. No company can bid that much cash in an auction. (Practically speaking, only a 
handful of foreign governments could). This implies that the source code of Windows 
would be sold forcibly at a small fraction of its worth – and that would severely reduce 
the value of shareholders’ equity. Auctioning the Windows code would not only 
effectively confiscate Microsoft’s intellectual property, it would also seriously reduce the 
incentive for innovation not only for Microsoft but for all potential innovators. Moreover, 
source code evolves. Over time, different firms will add and alter the Windows code. 
Soon, incompatibilities will arise, with all the negative consequences of diminution of 
network effects described earlier. 
6. Conclusion 
In my opinion, the RPFJ is a good and fair settlement that achieves the objectives of 
remedial relief without damaging the software industry. I would urge caution against a 
deeper intervention in the software industry, where fast technological change and very 
significant network effects make it very difficult to predict the medium and long run 
effects of such intervention. 
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